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ABSTRACT
In the last 25 years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
has been increasingly addressing some of themost divisive religion-
related issues facing European societies. In the process, it has been
setting from above certain parameters for religious pluralism in
Europe. The present contribution draws on research designed to
bring the Court’s influence on religious pluralism into sharp focus,
but from the ground up. We know more or less the direct effect of
the Court in terms of implementation of its decisions. But we lack
understanding of its indirect effects in terms of whether and how its
case law mobilises grassroots actors (rights consciousness raising,
agenda setting, bargaining ‘in the shadow’ of the Court). Such
understanding presupposes insight into levels of awareness of the
ECtHR and its religion-related case law: who knows what about
religion at the ECtHR and to what effects? This contribution pre-
sents results of a study engaging social actors in four countries.
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Introduction
The European project finds itself at an acute impasse in the present context of chal-
lenges on several fronts, from a lingering financial crisis in some of its states to demo-
cratic backsliding in others, an unresolved refugee crisis which threatened to unhinge all
semblance of unity to Brexit, literally unhinging the European Union and reflecting a
new nationalism which undermines much of what European institutions stand for. In this
context, there is a critical imperative to assess the popular legitimacy and popular effects
of its institutions. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, or the Court) is an
especially important European institution. The ECtHR is the ‘de facto Supreme Court of
human rights in Europe’ (Madsen 2016, 143) aiming to set common standards for Europe
and beyond: its broad geographic mandate covers over 800 million people across 47
states. In the area of religion-related case law specifically, the Court is important because
of its strikingly contentious topical ambit: from religious symbols in public spaces
(whether worn, as the headscarf, or on the wall, as the crucifix), to whether a right not
to be offended can be upheld through blasphemy laws, the Court has been addressing
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some of the most divisive and emotive issues facing European societies. And in the
process, the Court has been setting, from above, certain parameters for religious
pluralism in Europe.
The present text draws on research designed to bring the Court’s influence on
religious pluralism into sharp focus, but from the ground up (Fokas 2015a).1 We have
access to information about the direct effect of the Court in terms of implementation, or
not, of its decisions via policy change enacted by national governments (Anagnostou
and Psychogiopoulou 2013). But we lack insight into the indirect effects of the Court, in
terms of whether and the extent to which the Court’s case law mobilises grassroots level
actors in pursuit of their rights.
In focusing on the indirect effects of courts, this study is heavily influenced by a very
rich and well-developed North American socio-legal scholarship (see, for example,
Galanter 1983; McCann 1992, 1994; Scheingold 2004). The work of Michael McCann is
particularly instructive. In his Rights at Work (1994), a study of pay equity reform and the
politics of legal mobilisation, McCann explores how ordinary people have rather more
‘access’ to the law than is suggested by critical legal theory. In this decentred tradition of
legal analysis, courts are viewed as relatively peripheral to most forms of legal action,
given that actual resort to judicial intervention is more the exception than the rule and,
further, that compliance is only a very small part of the potential consequences of court
decisions (McCann 1992, 731–732, 1994, ix). A study of the indirect effects of case law
includes attention to the many ways its decisions are deployed by social actors in their
rights campaigns, and in many venues outside of courts. McCann’s work provides a
response to judicial impact studies which focus on the substantial gaps between the
promise of landmark court victories, on the one hand, and actual social change, on the
other, by shifting the focus away from what happens in courts to how court decisions
might influence what happens amongst civil society actors in their pursuit of their own
rights (McCann 1992, 735, 1994, 2–3).
Inspired by this study, the broader research project from which the present contribu-
tion emanates focuses not on the gap between the promise of certain court decisions
and actual social change but rather on the gap between such decisions and the change
in societal expectations: to what extent do court decisions lead to a shift in social actors’
conceptions of their rights, in their discourse about those rights and in their propensity
to pursue those rights, whether through legal or political means?
Answers to the above question presuppose a far more basic one: how aware of the
Court and its religion-related case law are social actors at the grassroots level? European
institutions are notoriously exposed to criticism as non-transparent and distant from the
citizen. This is no less the case for the ECtHR, often confused with the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU, which is in turn conflated with the European Court of
Justice – the ECJ – one of the three courts comprising the CJEU). The ECtHR is also
often wrongly assumed to be an institution of the European Union, as opposed to the
Council of Europe (CoE). To what extent does knowledge about the Court’s decisions
related to religion trickle down to grassroots actors with a vested interest in these
decisions, and to what effects?
In line with the bottom-up approach of McCann and other socio-legal scholars,
insight into such questions requires empirical, qualitative research conducted with
grassroots actors themselves (McCann 1992, 741–742). This text draws on a specific
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dimension of interview-based research on the indirect effects of the Court’s religion-
related case law at the grassroots level: on responses to a series of questions designed to
assess social actors’ awareness of the Court and its engagements with religion. Through
qualitative analysis, this research pursues a nuanced understanding of Court and case
law awareness.
Further, and recognising that legal knowledge ‘does not simply trickle down on
citizens and state officials in a unidirectional, determinate fashion’ (McCann 1992, 733),
the research underpinning this text is shaped by the perspective that judicially articu-
lated norms must be understood ‘in the eye of the beholder’, as they take a life of their
own at the grassroots level. In Marc Galanter’s words describing the ‘radiating effects’ of
the law, ‘the messages disseminated by courts do not carry endowments or produce
effects except as they are received, interpreted, and used by (potential) actors’ (Galanter
1983, 136; emphasis mine). Thus, the present study of awareness entails not only an
assessment of levels of knowledge about the Court and its religion-related case law, but
also a more contextualised understanding of how Court-produced messages might be
differently interpreted amongst different social actors and in different national and local
contexts. To this end, empirical research was conducted in several localities and
amongst a broad range of social actors in four countries and contexts: Greece, Italy,
Romania and Turkey.
While the North American socio-legal literature serves as an excellent resource and
inspiration, there are certain significant challenges to grafting the relevant theories onto
the European context. These are explored in the section below entitled ‘Challenges in
cross-continental grafting of legal scholarship’. Specifically, differences in the embedd-
edness of law and courts in American versus European culture and differences in both
the public and private place of religion in the two contexts are amongst a series of
factors explored for their potential impact on the indirect effects of case law in the US
versus European contexts.
The next section details the methodology underlying the research and is followed by
a presentation of the interview-based findings on grassroots level awareness of the
ECtHR and its religion-related case law. Here, the results of two types of analysis are
presented, the first addressing a number of factors influencing Court and case law
awareness across the country cases amongst the various categories of interviewees,
and the second focused on context-specific factors arising through comparative analysis
of the country cases.
Finally, the text closes with a summary of the research findings and points to the
need for ongoing research into the indirect effects of the ECtHR and its religion-related
case law, particularly in the context of the currently volatile relationship between
citizens and the European institutions meant to represent them.
Challenges in cross-continental grafting of socio-legal scholarship
As indicated above, a number of fundamental differences between the US and European
contexts require careful attention in the application of socio-legal theory generated in
the former setting. First, it is a cliché comparison and easily overemphasised, but
certainly at a general level the United States is characterised by a far more developed
judicialisation of politics than that which prevails in Europe. The latter is reflected in
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Alexis de Tocqueville’s much-cited observation that ‘scarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later, into a judicial question’ (de
Tocqueville [1840] 1956, 126). Of all European countries, the UK is closest to the
American model in this regard. Frances Zemans identifies in the US–Europe comparison
an Anglo-American legal tradition which considers that the public good will emerge out
of the assertion of individual claims, a view which, according to Zemans, ‘fits nicely with
the individualistic spirit that pervades American culture’ (1982, 995). That said, a judi-
cialisation of politics is rapidly spreading globally (Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998;
Kelemen 2011), and conspicuously so in Europe also, though with important distinctions
from the American model (Kagan 2007).
Also clichéd, but with a fair measure of truth, is the presumption of a religious
America and a secular Europe (Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008). According to the World
Values Study, ‘on average, Europeans are less likely than the inhabitants of any other
continent to say they believe in a deity or to attend religious services regularly’,2 and
according to the European Values Survey, only 20.5% of Western Europeans reported
attending religious services at least once a week, compared to some 46% in the USA.
About 53.3% of West Europeans said they believed in life after death, compared with
approx. 76% in the USA. Meanwhile, in a Eurobarometer survey of the top three values
cited by European citizens, 45% listed peace amongst these, 42% listed human rights
and 41% respect for human life; religion was mentioned by only 7% of respondents
(McCrea 2015). On the other hand, as Ronan McCrea notes, Europe is far from being an
entirely ‘godless’ continent: levels of nominal adherence to religion are high, while
majority Christian religious institutions and symbols remain important elements of the
national life and collective identity in most European states. Thus, McCrea explains,
Europe’s approach to religion is ‘characterized by an odd mixture of formal links
between religion and the state on the one hand and relatively limited substantive
religious influence over law, politics and society on the other’ (99–100). Those formal
links between religion and state underpin a great number of cases before the ECtHR (see
Fokas, 2018).
The judicialisation of politics in America and the centrality of religion in American
public life may or may not yield more intersections between law and religion. Certainly,
though in the US context, we see religious organisations often resembling large cor-
porations in terms of organisational structures, and with a highly developed legal
expertise and propensity to engage in ‘big politics’. But even beyond this political
field, religion has a conspicuous presence in US courts. Comparable data are not
available for the European context but in the USA, according to Sullivan (2005, 9),
lawsuits in which religion is at issue ‘occur with regularity in state and federal courts
all over the United States’. In part, the prevalence of religion in courts has to do with the
centrality of the non-establishment of religion and separation of church and state
clauses in the first amendment to the US Constitution. As a consequence, Sullivan
notes, the word ‘religion’ or ‘religious’ appears over 14,000 times in state and federal
statutes and regulations in the USA (11). Still, as in the case of the judicialisation of
politics, the judicialisation of religion, too, is an increasingly relevant phenomenon in the
European context. After all, it was not until 1993 that the ECtHR began engaging actively
with religious freedom cases. And at the national level too, demographic changes and
especially the increased presence of Islam in Europe, and a rise in secularist and atheist
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challenges to majority Christian privilege, both contribute to more religion-related case
law in Europe as well (McCrea 2015; Richardson 2015).
Third, and not unrelated to the points above, the workings of American courts are
much closer to the popular consciousness, not least through relatively more robust (as
compared with the European context) media coverage of court decisions – especially
those of the US Supreme Court. Central to the seminal work by Rosenberg (1991) and
Klarman (2001), criticising high expectations that US courts can produce meaningful
social change is an emphasis on what they perceive as poor media coverage of court
cases and consequent low levels of public awareness of these.3 The access to informa-
tion on court decisions more generally, especially online, is also critical to popular
awareness of these.4
Still, the contrast between the US and Europe in this regard is stark when considering
the presentation of poll data on popular awareness of the US Supreme Court, lamenting
gaps which, by European standards, would entail rather advanced knowledge. For exam-
ple, the results of a 2015 Pew Research Center study were presented as indicative of the
‘dim public awareness’ of the Supreme Court, based in part on the fact that only 33% of
Americans knew that there were three women on the Supreme Court (Dost 2015).
This begs the question of what exactly is meant by the term ‘awareness’. Critical
studies have been conducted on popular awareness of the US Supreme Court and on
the salience of its decisions at the grassroots level. These are instructive in refining
conceptions of court awareness: the latter may include, amongst other things, varying
levels of awareness of issues addressed by courts; details about the history, remit and
judicial makeup of the court itself; details of the case law and judgements emanating
from the court and procedural awareness or practical knowledge regarding how one
might reach a particular court with a rights claim (Franklin, Kosaki, and Kritzer 1993;
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Hoekstra 2003; Scott and Saunders 2006). Notably,
none of these texts concentrate on rights consciousness and rights pursuit as potentially
linked to court awareness.
In the broader research on which this contribution draws, the interest is on the latter
dimension. Specifically, public awareness of the ECtHR is considered an important first
stage in the potential of the Court to influence social actors’ awareness and conceptions
of, as well as propensity to pursue (whether through legal or political channels) their
own rights. The focus is primarily on case law (i.e. familiarity with particular cases or the
topics addressed by the Court, even where case names are not known) but, where case
law-specific awareness is low, the study seeks to assess whether and the extent to which
more general awareness of the Court as an actor influencing human rights provision
impacts in some way on grassroots actors’ conceptions and pursuit of religion-related
rights.
As Hoekstra (2003) argues, we are misguided in focusing on uniform national effect of
case law; more attention to localised effect is encouraged, but ‘the process is just more
subtle and possibly more gradual’ (105). Indeed, the Court’s messages are variously
filtered in different cultural contexts, and thus, the effect on rights consciousness and
pursuit is also expected to be more localised. Hence, the choice to conduct the present
study in different national contexts.
It should be noted that much of the socio-legal literature employed in the present
study is focused on the US Supreme Court, which makes for an uneven application in
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the case of the ECtHR (Fokas 2015b).5 Also, the status of the ECtHR as an international
court (IC) deserves special attention. According to Alter, Helfer, and Madsen (2016), the
ultimate expression of a court’s authority is that amongst the public, but this level of
authority is exceedingly difficult for an IC to achieve, for a number of reasons. First, they
tend to be newer institutions, and the newness of ICs in general as judicial institutions
constitutes a significant challenge to the authority they can establish. Further, they
operate within a context of international regime complexity, which may entail competi-
tion amongst courts. Related to the latter, as Alter, Helfer and Madsen set out, lawyers,
government officials, etc. often have deeply held ideas about national sovereignty, and
these actors are key to the establishment of a court’s authority.
Popular authority, these scholars argue, ‘exists when recognition of IC rulings extends
beyond the legal field to encompass the public in general’, but ‘given their relatively young
age, new ICs are yet to reach the stage where publics understand, let alone recognise, the
authority of ICs’ (Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 2016, 11–12). They note that the specialised
mandates of some courts may limit the extent to which publics ever recognise IC authority.
Hence, the authors’ decision not to consider this level of authority in their study of a
number of ICs. According to Alter, Helfer and Madsen, the level of authority enjoyed by the
ECtHR is extensive authority. A court with extensive authority has an audience which
extends beyond its compliance partners to include an even broader range of actors such
as civil society groups, bar associations, industries and legal scholars (10).
It follows from the latter analysis that the ECtHR, as other ICs, cannot be expected to
have popular authority. Certainly the ECtHR is characterised by the challenges listed
above. It is, as indicated earlier, a fairly young court (relative to western European
national courts, though second oldest in the list of those studied by Alter, Helfer and
Madsen). It has a specialised mandate. And it also exists in a web of multiple levels of
authority which includes, vertically, different relationships with the national courts of the
47 member states, and horizontally, decisions especially by the United Nations Human
Rights Commission and, increasingly, the CJEU, which has recently significantly stepped
up its engagement with religious freedoms issues (see Fokas 2016).
All of the above makes for significantly different expectations to be had from the
popular effects of the ECtHR, an IC of the CoE, not the EU (thus not in fact even in some
way directly linked to governance of a semi-federal body; the EU at least has a parlia-
ment with officials elected from each member state and entails political and economic
and social governance in a way not relevant to the CoE). The Court is not particularly
widely covered by national media – with the exception of the UK (where media cover-
age has generally harmed rather than enhanced its authority). Thus, the ECtHR and the
US Supreme Court are fundamentally differently embedded in society. It follows that
while the ECtHR may (and does) take equally major decisions in the domain of religion,
their reverberation at the grassroots level is, or at least may be expected to be, rather
more limited than in the US context. The research underpinning the present text sets
out to assess these reverberations.
Methods
As McCann notes, most scholarship at the intersection between law and social move-
ments is court-centred, ‘sticking close to official case law and actions of legal elites while
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remaining distant from grassroots movement activity’ (2006, 17). To this end, fieldwork
was conducted with grassroots level actors in four different country contexts – Greece,
Italy, Romania and Turkey. The Court’s religion-related case law bears special relevance
in these countries where religion is socially, culturally and politically significant, and the
stakes are perceived by a broad range of religious, social and political actors to be
relatively high in relation to ECtHR judgements on religion. In each of these countries, a
strong relationship between religion and national identity, and church and state
(whether ‘positive’, in the cases of Greece, Romania and Italy, or ‘negative’, as in the
case of Turkey) renders highly salient, in theory at least, the Court’s pronouncements
that bear the potential to influence the public place of religion.
Meanwhile, the selection of cases represents a spectrum of levels of democratisation
and Europeanisation, with Italy and Greece being rather more consolidated democracies
(and with membership in the European unification project established in 1958 and 1981,
respectively), and Romania and Turkey less consolidated democracies (and with more
recent membership in the EU for Romania in 2007 and a continued negotiation process
with Turkey). When considered comparatively, the research helps identify the signifi-
cance of each of these dimensions when it comes to the impact of the ECtHR on the
ground in various country contexts.
A first aim of the grassroots level fieldwork was to test the awareness of religion-
related case law amongst relevant social actors. ‘Religion-related’ is broadly defined in
this research and, thus also, the scope of social actors with ‘vested interest’: ‘religion-
related’ includes issues either directly implicating religion (e.g. wearing or display of
religious symbols in public spaces, or the right to places of worship or to conscientious
objection based on religious convictions) or mobilising religious publics, often because
the issue touches on core religious values or doctrines (e.g. social ethics issues such as
abortion, same-sex marriage), or by the same token mobilising secularist publics in cases
touching on religion-state relations and the place of religion in the public sphere, but
also in counter-mobilisations against religious arguments on issues of social ethics.
Insight into levels and consequences of grassroots actors’ awareness of the ECtHR
and its case law is drawn from a thorough reading of approximately 70 interviews
conducted by postdoctoral researchers based on the four case study countries with
representatives of a broad range of conscience-based groups (majority and minority
religious as well as secular and secularist); representatives of NGOs dealing with religious
freedoms and human rights more generally; cause lawyers who undertake issues related
to religion and social ethics and government officials responsible for matters of religious
freedom.6 The present study includes 24 interviews with legal experts, 16 with NGO
representatives, 15 with minority conscience-based group representatives, 10 with
majority faith representatives and 6 with government officials.7
The interviews were semi-structured, drawing from a shared basic interview guide
which included an ‘awareness non-test test’. Specifically, in order to help with our
understanding of levels of interviewee awareness of the Court and its case law, built
into the interview guide was a test of the interviewee’s awareness of six particular ECtHR
religion-related cases – Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), Lautsi v. Italy (2009, 2011), Folgero v.
Norway (2007), SAS v. France (2014), Sindicatul Păstorul cel bun v. Romania (2013) and
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (2004). The list of cases includes one from each case study country
included in the broader research programme, as well as older (Kokkinakis) and more
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recent (SAS) cases, and key cases for issue areas studied in the broader research
programme (e.g. for the study of religious education, Folgero). The ‘awareness non-test
test’ was to be administered with great care to not give the impression to the inter-
viewee that his or her personal knowledge of the case law was being tested as an end in
and of itself rather than a means to understanding something broader about grassroots
level awareness of the Court and its case law. In practice, however, administering the
‘awareness test’ in a non-intimidating manner was rather difficult in the context of
several interviews; thus, the data are not systematic within or across all country case
studies. Still, much insight may be gleaned from a careful reading of the transcripts,
wherefrom knowledge can be assessed well beyond responses to the specific awareness
questions.
Who knows what about religion at the ECtHR and to what effects?
The following discussion is devoted to developing an understanding of a variety of
factors influencing levels of awareness of ECtHR religion-related case law and of the
consequences of the latter. A first subsection entails a comparative analysis, wherein
attention is paid to aspects of the different cultural, political and legal contexts of
each of the four countries under study in efforts to understand the impact of these
contextual factors on grassroots awareness of the ECtHR and its religion-related case
law. The second subsection, derived from an aggregate analysis of the interview data
across all four countries, focuses specifically on the role of agency and sources of
information (or lack thereof) regarding the Court: one of the starkest findings of the
present research, which in fact prompted the drafting of the present text, focused
specifically on the question of awareness, is how little grassroots non-legal actors
tend to know about the Court’s case law. Thus an analysis hinging on legal knowl-
edge and sources of information about the Court is particularly worthwhile. It should
be noted that, in general, the research generated less insight into messages commu-
nicated by the Court through particular religion-related judgements, and more
insight instead into diffused messages about the Court, its impact on religion-
related issues and its potential impact for grassroots actors, yielded by perceptions
(of varying levels of accuracy) of the totality of the Court’s case law and its impact at
the national level.
Cross-country comparative analysis
Can we gain a deeper understanding of the indirect effects of the Court by considering
the data comparatively across different political, social and cultural contexts? The
different reverberations of the case of Lautsi v. Italy across different country contexts
suggest this is the case. The Lautsi judgement of 2009 found a violation of Article 2 of
the 1st Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (that protecting the right
to education in accordance with one’s philosophical or religious beliefs) in the manda-
tory display of the crucifix in Italian public schools. However, following the Italian state’s
appeal and an unprecedented number of third party interventions by national govern-
ments, NGOs and Members of the European Parliament, the Grand Chamber reversed
the decision in 2011. The judgement indicated that because the Italian public school
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system was otherwise sufficiently religiously neutral, it was within the state’s margin of
appreciation to maintain the display of the crucifix in the schools.
Regarding messages received by non-specialist (non-legal) grassroots actors, in
Greece a predominant message received was that the authority on these issues remains
at the national level, and religious symbols are allowed in public schools. In Italy, non-
legal actors interpreted the judgement as an indication that the Concordat between the
Italian state and the Roman Catholic Church trumps most else, and no challenges to
religion-state relations (and to majority religion privileges) would be upheld by the
ECtHR. Meanwhile, the same categories of respondents in Romania read in the Lautsi
verdict a blow to any minority religious claims. Only in Turkey, amongst the cases
examined here, did Lautsi not reverberate much of anything amongst grassroots non-
legal actors. Behind each of these different receptions and interpretations of the Lautsi
case is a story specific to each country and comprised of a number of sub-themes. The
latter are presented below as contextual factors which give shape to our cross-country
comparative analysis.
First, variation in national political and legal opportunity structures across country
cases is key to degrees of awareness of the Court and its case law. Within this factor,
there are also significant variations from one issue area to the next. For example, LGBT
activists in Greece with little hope of achieving their aims through political lobbying are
more likely to litigate in the first place and, with low expectations of the national courts
regarding LGBT rights, are more likely to become informed of the opportunities offered
by the ECtHR. An Italian lawyer representing minority interests declares ‘luckily, there is a
judicial space in which we can advance with rights, while politics does nothing’.
Similarly, in Turkey religious minority groups express little hope in both the national
political and legal opportunities for securing their rights: ‘Every time we went to national
courts we lost. We usually see them as a way to the European Court of Human Rights’.
Closely related to the latter is where the Court stands within the national legal order,
both de jure and de facto (with the latter much influenced by how national judges view
the Court). In the Italian case, several Constitutional Court rulings have sought to clear a
blurred status of international law in Italian law, culminating with a judgement (49/2015)
through which the Italian Constitutional Court narrowed the domestic impact of the
ECtHR case law. The judgement entailed an appeal to domestic judges to refrain from
applying the ECtHR’s case law where: (a) there is a high degree of jurisdictional
creativity, which implies that the new principle is not well settled in the case law; (b)
there are inner conflicts within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence; (c) the principle is promul-
gated by a Chamber rather than Grand Chamber decision; (d) the ECtHR judgement
displays a misunderstanding of the Italian legal context and (e) the decision is accom-
panied by dissenting opinions (Pin and Tega 2015). As a result, the Court provides lesser
bargaining power before Italian national courts. In the words of one Italian lawyer,
echoing Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope:
In the end, we always come back to the fact that it is a task of the national state. The
European instrument is essential, it is absolutely crucial, but the European instrument does
not help you to change your laws, if you do not want to. That is, if the national legislature
and the regional legislatures do not make those principles their own, we can go as many
times as we want to the ECtHR, but we will never reach a definitive solution.
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We find comparatively far higher hopes in the ECtHR emanating from Romanian and
Turkish respondents, and this in part has to do with a greater embeddedness of the Court
in the national judicial system which accompanied the EU accession process. Specifically,
as part of the democratisation process entailed by the various stages of EU accession, in
both countries lawyers and judges undergo rigorous training in the Convention system
and in ECtHR case law; in the Romanian case, judicial promotions are intimately linked to
judges’ level of citation of ECtHR case law in their own judgements.8 The latter is likely to
have a trickledown effect on grassroots actors’ awareness, and expectations, of the Court,
in terms of its impact on religion-related rights in general (not necessarily on rights claims
of individual interviewees, and hopes of securing their rights before the ECtHR them-
selves; see below). According to one Romanian NGO representative, ‘the ECtHR is the only
effective international human rights mechanism’; the sentiment is echoed by other
Romanian, as well as Turkish, respondents, in particular.
Third, and beyond where the Court stands in the national legal order, also critical is
where the majority faith stands in the ‘national religious order’: in all the country cases
under study here, there is a system in place of distinguishing between rights and
privileges afforded by the state to different religious groups, arranged in different
forms of hierarchy in each case. The extent to which a majority faith enjoys a
particularly privileged position, with this privilege established and maintained through
Constitutional provisions – especially when considered in conjunction with the place of
the Court in the national legal order – may significantly impact upon social actors’
conceptions of the Court as a potential resource and thus worth informing oneself
about. Here the Greek and Italian cases fall into one category and the Romanian and
Turkish into another (though the latter not purely because of the lack of a legally
privileged majority religion, as is suggested above). The Greek constitutional provisions
setting out the Orthodox Church of Greece as the ‘prevailing faith’, and the terms of
the Concordat between the Italian state and the Roman Catholic Church, both serve to
discourage actors seeking to challenge that privilege (whether minority religious
groups or secularist groups), and by extension limiting their expectations of the
ECtHR in this aim.
In the Greek and Italian cases especially, the Lautsi Grand Chamber decision solidified
the perception that the ties that bind church and state in these contexts are stronger
than the Convention system’s defence of minority (whether secularist or religious) rights.
It also influenced greater attention amongst interviewees to the concept of the margin
of appreciation (Fokas 2015a). Emphasis on the margin of appreciation is disproportio-
nately high in the interviews with Greek social actors (viewed positively by majority
religious respondents and negatively by conscience-based minority groups) – dispropor-
tionate both in relation to the other country cases and in relation to knowledge of other
aspects of the Court and its case law. As a result, ECtHR judgements are referred to as ‘a
suggestion’, and as acquiring ‘an autonomy at the national level’. One Greek majority
faith representative asked:
I wonder what the main criterion of judgment is in the Court’s decisions. Shouldn’t this
criterion be societal cohesion? […] There is a certain contradiction in the Court: on the one
hand it seeks to protect minorities, on the other however it considers what each state would
want.
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Meanwhile, the ‘shadow of Lautsi’, in terms of a quashing of religious minority and
secularist hopes of any change to the status quo in church-state relations, is particularly
pronounced in the Italian case, as evinced by the following remark made in relation to
Lautsi final judgement: ‘the EU bodies should be careful not to respect the local culture
too much, otherwise they risk supporting something that in Italy is also anachronistic.
The ruling on the crucifix is anachronistic for Italy’.
Fourth, the national track record of the state in question in relation to the ECtHR may
impact levels of grassroots awareness of the Court: how much case law against the state
in question is there before the Court, and with what percentage of violations found? As
Madsen (2016) indicates, Italy and Turkey are the two countries with the highest
numbers of cases against them at the ECtHR, and with the highest numbers of violations
found, though for different underlying reasons. In Italy, the case law pointed to the
technical need for modernisation of the Italian judiciary: mainly due to violations of
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) because of the excessive length of Italian trials. By the early
2000s, judgements against Italy accounted for an average of 45% of the total number of
judgements delivered by the Court (163). In Turkey, the large number of cases has more
to do with problems in democratisation. In both cases, the negative experience of the
countries with the Court (in general and not particular to the religious domain) raised
levels of popular awareness of the Court at the grassroots level. But this awareness
remains at a superficial level and does not translate into detailed enough knowledge as
to influence actors’ rights consciousness or pursuit.
The latter effect is heightened by poor track records in terms of implementation of
the judgements. According to Madsen, of the approximately 2400 cases decided against
Turkey between 1987 and 2001, of which 87% found at least one violation, around 1700
judgements were not fully implemented as of 2012 (Madsen 2016, 164). The prevalence
of this fact in Turkish social actors’ perceptions is striking: nearly every respondent in the
Turkish case study made reference to Turkey’s poor implementation record, across all
categories of respondents.9 The same fact also served as justification, offered by several
respondents, for lack of awareness of case law beyond the Turkish country context,
‘because we have enough cases against Turkey to refer to’.
The question arises whether the latter discourages social actors from thinking about
the Court as a potential resource. One interviewee claimed:
In Turkey, every time someone is in a legal struggle for his or her rights, they say ‘We will go
to ECtHR!’ ‘If nothing else, we will go to ECtHR.’ You know there is a saying in Turkish ‘Do
not feel so proud of yourself my Sultan, there is Allah greater than you.’ Now we say ‘Do not
feel so proud the courts in Turkey, there is ECtHR greater than you!’ We say it jokingly yes
but this also really our perspective on the issue.
Yet later in the course of the interview the same respondent indicated that ‘Yes, the
ECtHR is greater than our national courts and has great decisions, but as long as there is
no implementation it does not make a difference’. We have found similar assessments
amongst several Turkish interviewees, particularly those without legal expertise.
Given the similarities between the Romanian and Turkish cases on several points, it is
interesting to note a stark difference in conceptions of accessibility of the Court: several
Romanian respondents perceive of the Court as ‘too far’, and of litigating before the
Court as a rather distant (and expensive) prospect, whereas by and large Turkish
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respondents see a rather clear and accessible path to the Court: the path through
national courts may be long, but it is rather more certain to lead to the ECtHR. The
distinction between the two cases on this point seems to be linked to the difference
between the volume of religion-related cases against each state in question.
Of agency and information
Amidst the significant differences in levels (and consequences) of awareness of ECtHR
religion-related case law found amongst respondents across the four country-based case
studies, one stable factor across all cases is the conspicuous role played by agency. More
precisely, the data naturally draw distinctions between the awareness levels of legal
experts (whether cause lawyers undertaking cases before the ECtHR, legal scholars or
legal advisors to NGOs or conscience-based groups) and that of other respondents. As
noted by Alter, Helfer and Madsen (2016, 24), legal experts, including practicing lawyers
and legal academics, are often central to the development of a court’s authority: ‘narrow
or intermediate authority is often associated with a handful of legal practitioners who
are frequent judicial interlocutors’. This has certainly been borne out through the field-
work conducted: in each case study a number of interviewees stand out at those who
have led the way in case law against their respective states. Thus, the effects of their
awareness of the Court and its case law are particularly salient in terms of rights pursuit.
Their role also tends to be significant in terms of rights consciousness, as these lawyers
are often the primary source of information for members of various NGOs and con-
science-based groups about rights established through ECtHR jurisprudence. As Zemans
(1982, 1013) notes, legal competence is thus more than passive knowledge of rights and
duties but, rather, ‘an active and searching awareness of the opportunities offered by
law for enhancing one’s position in society’ (1009–1010). And lawyers in the continuous
employment of those whose rights they represent can serve as the client’s rights
consciousness by providing for their clients that ‘active and searching awareness of
the opportunities offered by law’ (1013).
Thus, a first rather obvious factor influencing social actors’ awareness of the Court
and its case law across all country cases is the role played by agency and, specifically,
whether the interviewee is a lawyer, has legal expertise or belongs to a group employing
an in-house lawyer. There are clear distinctions in the levels of awareness between those
belonging to none of these three sub-categories of ‘legal competence’ and those who
do, as well as within these three sub-categories. Across all cases we found a strong
tendency of interviewees without such legal competence to defer to lawyers for the
‘non-test test’, as well as regarding any other details about the Court. One interviewee
responded to the first question testing case law awareness with the question ‘Are you a
lawyer?’ Thus, amongst respondents beyond the aforementioned three sub-categories
of legal competence, we found a strong sense that talk of case law is ‘for lawyers only’.
Strategic litigants fall into a category of their own: they stand out especially for their
cautious approach, revealing a high level of awareness of the risks involved, for the
greater cause in question, in a potential loss before the ECtHR. This fact reflects a higher
level of awareness of the workings of the Court, its impact, etc. which tends to be
accompanied by a broad repertoire of cases from which they drew during the course of
the interviews. That said, this broad repertoire, even for strategic litigants (the category
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exhibiting the highest levels of case law awareness), generally remains within the scope
of the issue-area with which they work (e.g. LGBT-related issues or religious autonomy).
As one legal expert put it,
It takes time to find out about [ECtHR decisions]. Not all jurists have this reflex – unlike the
way most of us have the reflex to check for amendments in Romanian law, to look in a
legislation database to see what happened to law X, if the Parliament amended it […] it’d
be an illusion to think that the average magistrate, lawyer, or finally, jurist first thing in the
morning checks the ECHR case law. No European jurist […] no jurist without a special
interest in ECHR does that.
Amongst respondents with no legal expertise, representing conscience-based groups
which do not employ legal experts, the vast majority showed little to no awareness of
any particular ECtHR cases; at best they tended to recall themes addressed by the Court
but without being able to name the cases directly.
This leads us to a second factor influencing social actors’ awareness of the Court and
its religion-related case law: the availability of information about the Court, whether
through the mass media10 or other means, such as information disseminated through
larger groups’ (whether religious, non-religious or NGO) own channels of information.
Here stark differences between the US and European contexts in this regard return to
the forefront of attention: for example, the members of many churches and religious
organisations in the USA have relatively high levels of knowledge of court decisions
because information about these is disseminated actively by the groups themselves,
through newsletters as through the pulpit.11 Such information dissemination is less
common within religious groups and organisations in the countries under study here,
whereas – and in line with Frances Zemans’ point noted above regarding the ‘Anglo-
American legal tradition’ – such tendencies are to be found more prominently amongst
groups in the UK.12 Yet, new distinctions arise between, for example, the awareness
levels of members of religious groups with a base in the USA and those without. In the
case of groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, with their highly centra-
lised leadership from a base in Brooklyn, a Jehovah’s Witness in Romania may have
equal access to information about ECtHR cases as her fellow believer in the USA. Thus,
the role of the mediating institutions – the specific sources of information about the
ECtHR and its case law provided within certain groups – deserves careful attention.13
A third factor is the degree to which the group represented by the interviewee (where
applicable) is generally litigious or not (a point which often correlates with whether the
group employs an in-house lawyer). Certain conscience-based groups rather adamantly
avoid, or seek out, courts for their rights claims. Muslim minority groups across all cases
tend to belong to the former category, while Jehovah’s Witnesses, and atheists, belong to
the latter. The comment of one Muslim minority spokesperson is representative of the
perspective found amongst many in a similar position: ‘Well, [the ECtHR] is indeed relevant
for us, but I wouldn’t want us to end up there’.
The latter point links to the tendency found amongst many respondents across all
cases to speak about the act of taking a case to the ECtHR as fundamentally anti-
national. References are made to wanting to be good citizens, or to avoid displaying ‘our
dirty laundry’ in Europe. And both categories of the less litigious and the ‘stoic-patriotic’
tend to display lower levels of detailed awareness about the Court and its case law.
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Further analytical work needs to be done on a fuller data set in order to detect
patterns in issue-related versus nation-specific awareness, but preliminarily it can be
noted that NGO representatives and cause lawyers seem to display an awareness limited
to particular issues-areas, but which might cross national boundaries (the latter is not
generally the case), while the case law awareness of representatives of conscience-based
groups tends to be specific to cases against their own country.
Enough respondents indicated the unattainability of the ECtHR due to limited financial
resources to suggest that there is a correlation between financial resources and case law
awareness, given that these interviewees also showed with lower levels of case law
awareness. (Whether their assessments of the related costs are realistic or not was not
assessed by the researchers). Here, too, the distinction between respondents with or
without legal expertise is stark. Specifically, financial resources are discussed by those
with legal expertise only as potential barriers to interest in and awareness of the Court
because of the high cost of exhausting all national legal remedies (a point which varies
from country to country, as discussed below). This category of respondents knows well
enough that the cost of litigating before the ECtHR itself should not discourage aiming to
reach the Court, as pro bono and strategic litigants’ support is almost always available at
this stage of litigation, if not from within the country than from beyond. In contrast, those
without legal expertise tend to link high costs only with litigating before the ECtHR.
Also notable is the tendency of interviewees with lesser legal awareness to seek to
learn more about the Court through the interviews. ‘What happened next?’, asked one
Romanian interviewee, after having been told the basics of the SAS case. ‘How much can
the ECtHR get involved in a country’s legislation?’, he asked later in the course of the
interview, and ‘Which are the European countries that accept all ECtHR decisions?’ Such
probing questions were common enough – particularly in the Greek and Romanian
interviews – as to raise questions regarding the line between observation and
intervention.
Conclusions
In spite of the objective challenges to applying North American socio-legal scholarship,
much of which is focused on the United States Supreme Court, to a study of the indirect
effects of the ECtHR and its case law, such study is considered worthwhile for the
insights it has generated regarding awareness of the Court and its case law. First and
foremost socio-legal scholarship has inspired study of Court impact at the grassroots
level (McCann 1992, 741–742): only at this level, and through in-depth qualitative
research, can we get a sense of what the Court and its case law means for religious
pluralism on the ground, for social actors with a vested interest in religion-related
(broadly defined) case law.
The Lautsi case serves as a foil for cross-country comparative analysis, as its different
reverberations across the cases are revealing of country context-specific relationships
with and orientations towards the Court. Comparative analysis across the cases reveals a
range of factors influencing levels of awareness of the Court and its case law, including
variation in national political and legal opportunity structures; the de jure and de facto
standing of the Court stands within the national legal order; the de jure and de facto
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place of the majority faith within the ‘national religious order’; the national track record
before the court and the national implementation record.
Further, by honing in on levels of awareness of the Court and its case law, the
research underpinning this contribution taps into a critical indicator of the extent to
which the Court has the potential to be practically relevant to social actors working at
the grassroots level. In revealing relatively low levels of awareness of case law (relative at
least to the North American context and, specifically, to the US Supreme Court), the
research gives rise to an imperative for greater public information about the ECtHR and
its case law. It lends credence to generalised conceptions of European institutions as
relatively far from the citizen – at least, from the non-legal citizen – when case law is
thought to be a matter strictly for lawyers. The research results support Rosenberg’s
(1991) and Klarman’s (2001) claims regarding a link between low levels of media
attention to and public information available about the Court, on the one hand, and
hollow hope in expectations of social change, but only with regard to social actors
lacking in legal expertise. As Alter, Helfer and Madsen explain, and as is borne out in the
scholarship presented here, it is legal experts who are especially critical to the develop-
ment of a court’s authority through their conspicuous role as providers of information
regarding courts and their case law; here indeed we find significant mobilising power of
the case law of the ECtHR. Thus, in examining the aggregate interview data, a distinction
between actors with legal expertise versus those without becomes particularly salient.
Further, the research also points to a need for greater understanding of the mediating
institutions in the generation of legal knowledge for consumption by their own mem-
bers and, specifically, the generation of information about the ECtHR and its case law.
Thus, the role of in-house legal expertise is one thing, and that of mass media
coverage of the ECtHR quite another. The attention to media coverage serves as a
window onto a larger point regarding public relevance of the Court: in the European
context, greater media attention has tended to be linked to an undermining of the
Court’s authority, as the example of the most media attention to the Court – that of the
UK – is also the case in which media attention has reflected an inward-looking nation-
alist-tending reaction to the Court’s perceived affront to national sovereignty. Herein lies
a particular challenge to the public authority of ICs, such as the ECtHR, in that the Court
represents populations of 47 different cultural, political, historical and social back-
grounds and narratives, each with potential concerns about encroachment on national
sovereignty by the ECtHR (see Christoffersen and Madsen 2013; Conant 2002 for a
discussion of relevant challenges in the context of the ECJ).
This point is supported by the many iterations amongst (again, non-legal) interviewees
across all cases of the concept of litigation before the ECtHR as a fundamentally ‘anti-
national’ act, even if for some in this category it is an act in which the interviewees
participate out of necessity, for lack of other opportunities to vindicate their rights claims.
As Hoekstra (2003) has suggested, the unfolding of localised effects of Court decisions
is subtle and gradual in nature. This fact entails a loud cry for ongoing research into the
indirect effects of the ECtHR case law, particularly in a time of change from a Court
driven more by international law to a Court currently especially vulnerable to national
politics (Christoffersen and Madsen 2013; see also Fokas 2016). The trickledown effect
takes time to develop, and there are currently many situations in flux in the realm of
national versus international politics. The Turkish case offers an example of effects
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already evident, wherein the impact of Turkey’s derogation from the ECHR leaves a
conspicuous mark on grassroots actors’ interest in engaging with the ECtHR. Thus
scholars should watch this space carefully in order to detect the aftereffects – again at
the grassroots level – of the particularist backlash against the ECtHR which has given
birth to greater emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation
(see Christoffersen and Madsen 2013; see also Fokas 2016). The latter will significantly
impact upon social actors’ engagements with the ECtHR but, as this research has shown,
this impact is likely to vary from one context to the next.
Finally, the research presented herein lends credence to the argument that judicially
articulated norms must be understood ‘in the eye of the beholder’, as they take a life
of their own at the grassroots level. Thus, the Court’s religion-related case law is only
as effective at the grassroots level as the power it is conceived to have by the
individuals and institutions mediating the relevant information about it. As such the
research further elaborates ‘the myth of rights’ (Scheingold 2004) by offering critical
insight into the different ways the Court’s case law impacts upon the grassroots level,
and the different consequences of the latter in terms of rights consciousness and
rights pursuit.
Notes
1. This text is based on data generated in the European Research Council-funded
Grassrootsmobilise research programme (GA no. 338463). The text relies on the interview
transcripts available at the time of writing – i.e. 71 interview transcripts – generated by the
postdoctoral researchers in Grassrootsmobilise (see www.grassrootsmobilise.eu). It also
draws on the monthly reports on the fieldwork drafted by the postdoctoral researchers
conducting the research in each country context, as well as on reports prepared on specific
aspects of the broader research programme and various versions of the researchers’ book
chapters and journal articles drafted on the basis of the research. I would like to thank my
colleague Dia Anagnostou for her comments on an earlier version of this text, as well as the
participants at the Grassrootsmobilise side event at the American Political Science
Association conference in San Francisco on 31 August 2017 (see http://grassrootsmobi
lise.eu/grassrootsmobilise-independent-session-apsa-annual-conference/), where this paper
was first presented, for their contributions to the fruitful discussion around the topics
addressed here, and in particular Michael McCann for his response specifically on this
paper. I am also grateful for the extremely helpful feedback offered by the anonymous
reviewers of this text. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the LSE Hellenic Observatory
(HO) for its facilitation of my work in Grassrootsmobilise.
2. This and the remaining poll data cited in this paragraph are drawn from McCrea (2015,
95–96).
3. Grassrootsmobilise entails also a study of media references to ECtHR religion-related
decisions. The latter entailed qualitative and quantitative examination of such references
across five mainstream newspapers in the four country case studies of Greece, Italy,
Romania and Turkey, and yielded – similar to Rosenberg and Klarman’s critiques – generally
low levels of media coverage of the case law (for more information, see www.grassroots
mobilise.eu). However, as eloquently argued by Sarahfina Aubrey Peterson in her Master’s
thesis (2014), reliance on print media for an understanding of public access to information
about courts is rather outdated: in the age of social media, ‘the local newspaper, or even
newspaper home websites are no longer responsible for the bulk of the news that people
consume. Instead, people often subscribe to newsfeeds and they share stories among their
family, friends and co-workers’ (17).
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4. According to van Opijnen et al. (2017) in a study of online publication of court decisions within
the EU, there are substantial differences across European states in terms of whether there are
legal or policy frameworks governing the online publication of court decisions, and the notion
of Open Data has not yet established a strong foothold within European judiciaries.
5. For more comparative work on the two courts, see, for example, Kiska (2013); Rosenfeld
(2006); O’Mahony and Dzehtsiarou (2013); Bribosia, Rorive, and Laura (2014); Witte and
Arold (2011); Gedicks and Annicchino (2015) and Calo (2013).
6. The interview data on which this paper draws (see note 1) is not evenly distributed across
the cases: 28 interviews from the Greek case study; 22 from the Italian case; 11 from the
Romanian case and 10 from the Turkish case. This imbalance is offset by the incorporation
of data from the broader research programme from which this contribution emanates, as
indicated in note 1.
7. These are more or less evenly distributed across the country cases, with the exception of
legal experts (9 in both the Greek and Italian cases, 3 in both the Turkish and Romanian
cases), a higher number of NGO representatives in the Italian case (8, as opposed to 2 in the
Greek case, 2 in the Romanian case and 4 in the Turkish case), and majority faith repre-
sentatives (with the vast majority in the Greek case).
8. See ‘National Court Studies’ [soon to be] available online.
9. It should be noted though that the sample of interview transcripts available for analysis at
the time of writing (10) is very small.
10. See note 3.
11. I owe this insight to Michael McCann, offered in his comments in response to an earlier
version of this text.
12. See, for example, the work of the London-based Christian Concern, the newsletter of which
disseminates detailed information about religion-related case law in the UK and at the ECtHR.
13. This is, at the time of writing, a work in progress in the Grassrootsmobilise research
programme, but see indicatively the ‘Note from the Field’ provided by researcher in the
Italian case study Alberta Giorgi, available at http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/8-italy-know-your
-rights-all-three-of-them/.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under Grant 338463.
Notes on contributor
Effie Fokas is the Principal Investigator of the European Research Council-funded project on
‘Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Examining Grassroots Mobilisations in the Shadow
of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedoms Jurisprudence’ (Grassrootsmobilise),
based at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), where Dr Fokas is
a Senior Research Fellow. Also at ELIAMEP she previously carried out a study of ‘Pluralism and
Religious Freedom in Orthodox Countries in Europe’ (PLUREL). She was founding Director of the
London School of Economics Forum on Religion and is currently Research Associate of the LSE
Hellenic Observatory. Her background is in political science and she holds a PhD in political
sociology from the London School of Economics. Her publications include Islam in Europe:
Diversity, Identity and Influence, co-edited with Aziz Al-Azmeh, and Religious America, Secular
Europe? A Theme and Variations, co-authored with Peter Berger and Grace Davie.
RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 265
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [7
7.4
9.6
2.1
36
] a
t 0
2:3
7 1
1 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
References
Alter, K., L. Helfer, and M. R. Madsen. 2016. “How Context Shapes the Authority of International
Courts.” Law and Contemporary Problems 79 (1): 1–36.
Anagnostou, D., and E. Psychogiopoulou, eds. 2013. The European Court of Human Rights:
Implementing Strasbourg’s Judgments on Domestic Policy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Berger, P., G. Davie, and E. Fokas. 2008. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations.
London: Ashgate Press.
Bribosia, E., I. Rorive, and V. D. E. Laura. 2014. “Same-Sex Marriage – Building an Argument before
the ECtHR in Light of the U.S. Experience.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 32 (1): 1–43.
Calo, Z. 2013. “Law, Religion and the Problem of Pluralism.” Paper presented at the conference on
the Impact of Religion: Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy, Uppsala, Sweden, May 20–22.
Christoffersen, J., and M. R. Madsen. 2013. “Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present, and Future
of the European Court of Human Rights.” In The European Court of Human Rights between Law
and Politics, edited by J. Christoffersen and M. R. Madsen, 2nd ed, 77–97. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Conant, L. 2002. Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union. Ithaka: Cornell University
Press.
De Tocqueville, A. [1840] 1956. Democracy in America. London: Mentor.
Dost, M. 2015. “Dim Public Awareness of Supreme Court as Major Rulings Loom.” http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/14/dim-public-awareness-of-supreme-court-as-major-rul
ings-loom/
Fokas, E. 2015a. “Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of
European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence.” Oxford Journal of Law
and Religion 4 (1): 54–74. doi:10.1093/ojlr/rwu065.
Fokas, E. 2016. “Comparative Susceptibility and Differential Effects on the Two European Courts: A
Study of Grasstops Mobilizations around Religion.” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 5 (3):
541–574. doi:10.1093/ojlr/rww050.
Fokas, E. 2018. “The Legal Status of Religious Minorities: Exploring the Impact of the European
Court of Human Rights.” Social Compass 64 (1).
Fokas, E. 2015b. “The Secular Court? Trends in the United States Supreme Court and the European
Court of Human Rights Compared.” In Modernities, Memory, Mutations: Grace Davie and the
Study of Religion, edited by A. Day and M. Lovheim, 163–177. London: Ashgate.
Franklin, C., L. Kosaki, and H. Kritzer. 1993. “The Salience of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions.” Paper
presented at the 1993 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. https://
faculty.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/research/opinion/apsa1993.pdf
Galanter, M. 1983. “The Radiating Effects of Courts.” In Empirical Theories about Courts, edited by
K. O. Boyum and L. M. Mather, 117–142. New York: Longman.
Gedicks, F. M., and P. Annicchino. 2015. “Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional
Meaning of Confessional Symbols.” First Amendment Law Review 13: 101–169. https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361260
Gibson, J., G. Caldeira, and V. Baird. 1998. “On the Legitimacy of National High Courts.” American
Political Science Review 92 (2): 343–358. doi:10.2307/2585668.
Hoekstra, V. 2003. Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Kagan, R. A. 2007. “Globalization and Legal Change: The ‘Americanization’ of European Law?”
Regulation and Governance 1 (2): 99–120. doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00009.x.
Kelemen, R. D. 2011. Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kiska, R. 2013. “Hate Speech: A Comparison between the European Court of Human Rights and the
United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence.” Regent University Law Review 25 (1): 107–151.
Klarman, M. 2001. “How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?” Virginia Law Review 87
(6): 1111–1184. doi:10.2307/1073950.
266 E. FOKAS
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [7
7.4
9.6
2.1
36
] a
t 0
2:3
7 1
1 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Madsen, M. R. 2016. “The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From
Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash.” Law and Contemporary
Problems 79 (1): 141–178.
McCann, M. 1992. “Reform Litigation on Trial.” Law & Social Inquiry 17 (4): 715–743. doi:10.1111/
j.1747-4469.1992.tb00637.x.
McCann, M. 1994. Rights at Work – Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
McCann, M. 2006. “Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives.” Annual Review of Law
and Social Science 2 (1): 17–38. doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105917.
McCrea, R. 2015. “De Facto Secularism in a Diversifying Religious Environment: The Changing
Relationship between State and Religion in Europe.” In Religion in the Public Sphere. Perspectives
on Secularism, edited by R. Uitz, 95–120. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.
O’Mahony, C., and K. Dzehtsiarou 2013. “Evolutive Interpretation of Rights Provisions: A
Comparison of the European Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court.” Columbia
Human Rights Law Review 44 (2): 309–365.
Peterson, S. A. 2014. “The Effect of Social Media on Public Awareness and Extra-Judicial Effects: The
Gay Marriage Cases and Litigating for New Rights.” Master’s Thesis submitted to Portland State
University. http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3086&context=open_
access_etds
Pin, A., and D. Tega. 2015. “Mini Symposium: Pin and Tega on Italian Constitutional Court
Judgment. No. 49/2015.” http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/04/mini-symposium-on-cc-
judgment-49-2015/
Richardson, J. 2015. “Managing Religion and the Judicialization of Religious Freedom.” Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion 54 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1111/jssr.12172.
Rosenberg, G. 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Rosenfeld, M. 2006. “Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S.
Supreme Court.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (4): 618–651. doi:10.1093/icon/mol027.
Scheingold, S. 2004. The Politics of Rights – Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change. 2nd ed. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Scott, K., and K. Saunders. 2006. “Supreme Court Influence and the Awareness of Court Decisions.”
Paper presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.520.5720&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Sullivan, W. F. 2005. The Impossibility of Religious Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
van Opijnen, M., G. Peruginelli, E. Kefali, and M. Palmirani. 2017. “On-line Publication of Court
Decisions in the EU. Report of the Policy Group of the Project ‘Building on the European Case
Law Identifier’.” http://bo-ecli.eu/uploads/deliverables/Deliverable%20WS0-D1.pdf
Witte, J., Jr., and N.-L. Arold. 2011. “Lift High the Cross? Contrasting the New European and
American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property.” Emory International Law
Review 25 (5): 5–55.
Zemans, F. K. 1982. “Framework for Analysis of Legal Mobilization: A Decision-Making Model.”
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 7 (4): 989–1071.
RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 267
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [7
7.4
9.6
2.1
36
] a
t 0
2:3
7 1
1 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
